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1. Introduction 
The introduction of smart technology in electricity markets may be important for improving 
the efficiency, reliability and cost effectiveness of future electricity supply (e.g. Faruqui et al., 
2010a, Faruqui et al., 2010b, Faruqui and Palmer, 2012). Primary aspects are the ongoing 
global roll-out of smart meters and the introduction of dynamic electricity tariffs, such as time-
of-use (ToU) tariffs. ToU tariffs charge different prices for electricity at different times of day, 
providing price signals to consumers to shift usage from peak to off-peak times. Smart meters 
and ToU tariffs are increasingly available to domestic electricity consumers across North 
America, Australasia and Europe. A 2009 European Union directive aims for at least 80% of 
consumers in participating countries to install smart meters in their homes by 2020 (European 
Parliament, 2009). For this infrastructural change to be cost effective, however, consumers 
need actually to take-up and engage with these products at levels greater than previously seen 
(Faruqui et al., 2010a). 
The present study was prompted by the forthcoming roll-out of smart meters and ToU tariffs 
in Ireland. It was conducted in collaboration with Ireland’s energy regulator, the Commission 
for Regulation of Utilities (CRU). The aim was to employ experimental behavioural science to 
investigate consumer attitudes, comprehension and decision-making towards smart meters and 
ToU tariffs. We undertook an exploratory laboratory study. Its four stages were designed to 
observe consumer decisions at four key points in the roll-out process of smart meters and ToU 
tariffs. Each stage addressed a specific research question, using tasks and experimental 
manipulations informed by the existing behavioural science literature. However, while 
designing the experiment it became apparent that previous research (see below) has focussed 
overwhelmingly on demand for different ToU tariffs without considering the capability of 
consumers to understand their own usage and to match it to an appropriate tariff. In 
experimentally assessing these capabilities, we address a gap in extant literature.  
The primary contribution of the paper is, therefore, to provide insights into consumer responses 
to the introduction of smart meters and ToU tariffs. By identifying and investigating some key 
psychological mechanisms underlying ToU tariff choice, the study provides evidence of 
relevance to energy regulation and policy, not only in Ireland but across international markets. 
Thus, a secondary contribution is to demonstrate how behavioural experiments can support 
empirically informed regulation (Sunstein, 2011).  
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Research questions were identified in collaboration with CRU. First, given that consumer 
engagement with and adoption of smart meters is likely to depend on initial sentiment, an initial 
research question was: 
1) What are consumers’ general attitudes towards smart meters? 
Three further research questions were linked to plans for the roll-out in Ireland. ToU tariffs are 
to be introduced in addition to existing flat rate tariffs1. Suppliers will also be required to offer 
a static ToU tariff2 with time periods determined by CRU but prices permitted to vary across 
suppliers (henceforth the standard ToU tariff). Importantly, suppliers will be able to offer 
additional static ToU tariffs that differ in both time periods and prices (Commission for 
Regulation of Utilities, 2018a). Thus, consumer choice between tariffs is likely to have an 
important bearing on the success of the policy. Testable research questions were: 
2) Does the framing of a “standard ToU tariff” alter its attractiveness? 
3) What information can help consumers choose between ToU tariffs based on their 
energy usage? 
4) How does the presentation of ToU tariffs affect the understanding and appeal of these 
tariffs? 
Consumer decision making capability cannot be taken for granted. It is a well-established 
finding that consumers often choose sub-optimally even among conventional flat rate 
electricity tariffs (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010). In Ireland, consumers could have saved 
€1,146 on their electricity bills by switching to the optimal supplier over the 2013-2017 period 
(Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 2018b). Undeniably, ToU tariffs introduce additional 
complexity to consumer choices. Increased choice complexity can reduce decision quality and 
lead some to avoid choosing altogether (Mogilner et al., 2008, Dowding and John, 2009). 
Consequently, it is important to understand how well consumers can choose among these 
innovative, but more complex tariffs, and to ascertain whether certain tools might be deployed 
to help consumers to make good choices. 
                                                          
1 The Irish market does contain day/night tariffs that operate via separate meters. The proportion of consumers 
on these tariffs is low, however, so they were not considered sufficiently important to feature substantially in the 
present study.  
2 A static ToU tariff is one in which the time periods for different rates are known and fixed. Other types of 
dynamic tariffs available in other countries include dynamic ToU, critical peak pricing and real time pricing (see 
Nicolson et al., 2018, for definitions of these). 
3 
 
Laboratory experiments are increasingly used to inform public policy and in social science 
more generally (Falk and Heckman, 2009). Although hypothetical measures of preference and 
(perhaps especially) willingness to pay can be subject to “hypothetical bias” (Harrison and 
Rutström, 2008), measures of capability are likely to be more reliable and can be incentivised 
(Lunn and Ní Choisdealbha, 2018). Exploratory designs that assess the accuracy of decision 
making at different stages of purchase have been successful in providing a wide range of 
insights in other public policy domains, for example in the regulation of car finance 
(McElvaney et al., 2018). For present purposes, we designed an exploratory laboratory 
experiment to record consumer decisions between ToU tariffs in a controlled environment. The 
novel design required participants to estimate their electricity usage across a week, and 
measured tariff choice quality based on this estimate.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 draws from the existing relevant literature 
to motivate our approach, which is outlined in Section 3. Section 4 provides the results and 
section 5 discusses these findings, considers policy implications, and highlights scope for 
future work. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Existing Literature 
2.1. Smart Meters 
One of the potential benefits of smart metering is that consumers can engage with their 
electricity usage more immediately (Sintov and Schultz, 2015). Although billing information 
has traditionally exposed consumers to infrequent periodic electricity usage (for example at 
monthly or bi-monthly intervals), smart meters record electricity usage periodically throughout 
each day. Feeding this directly to providers removes the need for physical meter readings. For 
consumers, electricity can be an invisible or abstract consumption good (Fischer, 2008), but 
smart meters in tandem with technology, such as in-home displays (devices to display real-
time electricity usage information), allow consumers to observe current electricity use and 
potentially alter usage. Previous research has investigated how smart meters and in-home 
displays influence electricity usage, especially when linked to dynamic electricity tariffs. Smart 
meters and feedback mechanisms have the potential to reduce usage by 2.5% - 12% (Fischer, 
2008, Faruqui et al., 2010b, Faruqui and Palmer, 2012, Commission for Energy Regulation, 
2011, Bager and Mundaca, 2017). 
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Regulators in Ireland have surveyed attitudes towards smart meters, finding that 43% of 
consumers would be willing to have one installed (Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 
2018b), a figure broadly consistent with other countries, including the UK (39%, Department 
of Energy and Climate Change, 2014). However, responses are typically gathered within a 
wider survey where respondents do not receive information about the potential benefits of 
smart meters, such as monetary gain and environmental improvement. Framing benefits in 
terms of environmental gains rather than monetary gains can increase acceptance of energy 
saving measures (Schwartz et al., 2015) or reduce actual usage (Asensio and Delmas, 2015), 
although others have found no such difference (Steinhorst et al., 2015). 
 
2.2. ToU Tariff Demand 
Research into ToU tariff acceptance has recorded substantial variation across countries and 
studies (Nicolson et al., 2018). Many studies have compared consumer attitudes to different 
dynamic electricity tariffs, including, but not limited to the static ToU tariffs to be introduced 
in Ireland. Typically, flat rate tariffs are preferred to any and all ToU tariffs (Dütschke and 
Paetz, 2013, Stenner et al., 2015), but different types of dynamic tariffs may be judged more 
or less appealing (Fell et al., 2015, Nicolson et al., 2018). 
Hobman et al. (2016) suggest that various mechanisms from behavioural science could 
influence attitudes and behaviour towards adopting ToU tariffs. Loss aversion (Nicolson et al., 
2017) and risk aversion (Qiu et al., 2017) can inhibit ToU tariff demand. Nicolson et al. (2018) 
show that opt-out policies are more effective than opt-in policies at inducing take-up, 
confirming the presence of default effects or status quo bias (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988). However, they also highlight the potential difficulty (and associated ethical question) of 
implementing an opt-out policy for ToU tariffs (p.287), suggesting “softer” approaches might 
be more appropriate. 
Far less research effort has investigated how consumers choose between ToU tariffs. In a meta-
analysis of ToU tariff demand by Nicolson et al. (2018), no study investigated consumers’ 
choices when faced with the same types of tariffs but with different time or pricing structures. 
Although experimental survey data has been used to study consumer choices between different 
types of dynamic pricing, this is fundamentally different to choices between different price 
points and time periods for the same type of tariff. In previous field studies investigating 
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consumer response to ToU tariffs in Ireland (e.g. Commission for Energy Regulation3, 2011) 
and the USA (e.g. Cappers and Sheer, 2016, for a review of studies), sample populations were 
randomly assigned to control or intervention groups. Typically in such studies, consumers in 
the control group remain on a conventional flat rate tariff, while those in the intervention group 
are arbitrarily assigned to a ToU tariff. This is a methodological construct to minimise selection 
bias when measuring subsequent behaviour, but it by definition does not consider consumer 
choice among tariffs as a factor. Yet, in reality, these are choices that consumers will have to 
make and which may have a strong bearing on the ultimate impact of smart meter installation. 
The lack of investigation of consumer choice therefore constitutes a gap in the literature. 
Research in other domains finds evidence of primacy effects: alternatives that are viewed first 
are evaluated more favourably than alternatives viewed later (e.g. Bruce and Papay, 1970, 
Belton and Sugden, 2018). The order in which tariff options are presented may thus influence 
choices. Additionally, when preferences are uncertain, individuals may look to expert opinion 
to help inform decision making (Beshears et al., 2008). Signalling to consumers that a 
particular tariff from a range is the “standard” may encourage take up of that tariff. Yet Hledik 
et al. (2017) failed to find a significant positive impact of promotional marketing messages in 
a binary switching task for energy tariffs, although the potential salience of an accreditation 
signal may increase when comparisons are made against multiple choice options. 
The presentation of ToU tariffs may affect both their attractiveness and consumers’ 
understanding of them. ToU tariffs are commonly presented in “traffic-light” colour-coding 
(e.g. Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011, BE Works, 2014). Research in other domains, 
such as food labelling, finds that such colour-coding can improve the comprehension of key 
information (Littlewood et al., 2016). Linearization of time (presenting a 24-hour clock in a 
linear, horizontal format) could also improve comprehension of ToU tariffs (BE Works, 2014). 
A challenge when deploying surveys and experiments rather than field trials is to define 
objective criteria for the quality of respondents’ decisions. In the present study, efforts were 
made to provide an appropriate benchmark for assessing the quality of tariff choices. In the 
absence of real usage data, other studies have relied on self-reports of when household 
appliances are used (Buryk et al., 2015) or whether most usage is during peak times (Qiu et al., 
2017). Here, we go further by asking participants to estimate their proportional electricity usage 
                                                          
3 The Commission for Energy Regulation preceded the current energy regulator, the Commission for Regulation 
of Utilities, in Ireland. 
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across the different time periods of a ToU tariff. From these estimates, costs may be compared 
for different tariffs and so quality of tariff choice can be assessed. This approach rests on the 
premise that to choose a good tariff consumers must generate some kind of internal 
representation or estimate of their own usage. Although an individual’s beliefs about when they 
use electricity throughout the day may differ from their actual usage, these initial beliefs will 
influence their initial perceptions of or engagement with ToU tariffs. 
The ability of consumers to choose an optimal electricity tariff given their current usage is only 
part of the decision of consumers. An additional important aspect of ToU tariffs is their role in 
encouraging energy behaviour change. However, the quality of consumer choice is likely be 
influenced by their initial perceptions of what constitutes a good tariff for them at present, and 
identifying potential for behaviour change (as well as accurately predicting the likelihood to 
follow through with the intended behaviour change) represents an additional complexity in 
tariff choice. It is first then an important empirical question to measure the effect of tariff choice 
without considering this additional complexity. 
A general advantage of behavioural laboratory studies such as this present study is that they 
enable complete control of the experimental environment (Lunn and Ní Choisdealbha, 2018). 
Because we were primarily interested in consumers’ ability to match their usage pattern to a 
tariff, the study was designed to control for anticipated future behaviour change as a rationale 
for tariff choice. Descriptions of how this was achieved are provided in the experimental 
designs for the relevant stages (found in sections 3.2 and 3.4). 
 
3. Experimental Design 
This study utilised an exploratory experimental methodology involving multiple stages. The 
advantage of exploratory studies, especially in domains relevant to policy, is that they allow 
for a sequence of research questions to be tested in a single study. A necessary trade-off is the 
need to simplify the experimental design at each stage. The stages in this study employed a 
combination of choice tasks, which were designed to mimic the consumer experience of the 
introduction of smart meters and ToU tariffs, and judgement tasks, which presented a series of 
multiple choice questions (MCQs) about the features of certain ToU tariffs. The choice tasks 
were: (1) Smart Meter Letter task, (2) Tariff Choice task, (4) ToU Price Comparison Site task. 
The judgement task was: (3) ToU Tariff MCQ task. The introduction of smart meters and ToU 
tariffs presents three key issues for consumers to consider: 
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1) Do I get a smart meter installed? 
2) Do I choose a ToU tariff? 
3) What tools can help me choose between different ToU tariffs? 
Figure 1 below shows how the stages in this experiment were designed to provide insight into 
each of these three questions. 
 
Figure 1. Experimental walkthrough of stages and consumer experience 
 
3.1. Smart Meter Letter task 
In this initial stage, participants were shown a letter from a fictional electricity supplier offering 
to fit a free smart meter in their homes. After reading the letter, participants were asked whether 
they would agree to the installation if they received that letter. In addition to basic information 
about smart meters and installation times, the letter contained information about the potential 
benefits of smart meters and future ToU tariffs, and the content of this was manipulated across 
participants in a 2 x 2 between-subject design4. The two manipulations were: 
                                                          
4 Full templates of the letters, and differences between formats can be found in Appendix A. 
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Benefits Framing: Half the letters contained potential environmental and infrastructural 
benefits of smart meters and ToU tariffs (the ‘Environment’ condition) and half contained 
potential monetary benefits (the ‘Money’ condition).  The differences in benefit framings 
within the two types of letters can be seen italicised below: 
 
 
 
Roll-Out Information: Half the letters contained a statement informing them that, since smart 
meter roll-out was a government objective, those who did not agree to installation may be 
contacted again in the future. This information was omitted in the other half of letters. The 
content of this roll-out information is below: 
 
 
Environment 
...“Smart meters can help each of us to do our bit for the environment by providing real time 
usage information and showing you how much electricity you are using at any given time. 
This can help you to cut out wasteful electricity use.”... 
...“[Time-of-use tariffs] help address the issues of demand on electricity supply, by charging 
more when demand is higher and less when demand is lower. This helps to make electricity 
supply more reliable and can reduce the risk of power outages.”... 
 
Money 
...“Smart meters can help to make electricity billing simpler by providing real time electricity 
usage. This removes the need for estimated bills and so means you only ever pay for the 
electricity you use.”... 
...“ [Time-of-use tariffs] may allow some customers to save money on their electricity bills by 
shifting their electricity usage to times of the day when electricity is cheaper. This can give 
customers more control over their electricity costs.”... 
 
“The government is committed to rolling out smart meters in every household by 2024. This 
means that if you do not arrange a smart meter installation now, we will get in touch to try 
and arrange installation at another time.” 
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This task was not the main aim of the study, and within the task itself, the main aim was to 
observe consumer attitudes towards smart meter installation in the presence of general 
information about smart meters and their benefits. Given a relatively small sample size (n= 
145), a 2 x 2 between-subject design meant any effect sizes would need to be substantial in 
order to detect an effect between the specific manipulations. Nevertheless, the presence of a 
large effect size following relatively small manipulations to the letter content could be of 
interest to policy makers in the design of communication material, and so we judged the above 
manipulations to be of interest. 
 
3.2. Tariff Choice task 
In the next stage, participants were asked to imagine that a smart meter had been installed in 
their home5. They were shown four tariffs and asked to choose the one they would prefer if 
they were making the decision in real life. They were not explicitly asked to consider their 
electricity usage patterns at this point. The four tariffs were: 
Standard ToU (ToU):  Four different tariff periods throughout a 24-hour period. This tariff was 
designed in collaboration with CRU and was the target tariff of interest. 
Non-Standard (NS3) ToU: An alternative with three different tariff periods that might be made 
available in addition to the Standard ToU tariff. 
Non-Standard (NS2) ToU: An alternative with only two different tariff periods – day and night 
– that might be made available in addition to the Standard ToU tariff.  
Flat Rate: A conventional flat rate tariff where the price of electricity did not change throughout 
a 24-hour period6. 
The prices of these tariffs were designed such that the Standard ToU tariff was cheaper than 
the alternatives for all but those with highly unusual usage patterns – those consuming a 
substantial percentage of electricity during the most expensive period. This strategy enabled an 
estimation of the financial cost of any aversion to these ToU tariffs. Note that this stage 
imposed a forced choice, whereas in reality consumers might be able to avoid making a choice 
and simply remain on their current tariff. The forced choice was used to counter the potential 
                                                          
5 In the instructions for Stage 2 the motivation for why a smart meter would be installed in their home differed 
according to their response in Stage 1. 
6 Details of the time periods of rates for each tariff are outlined in Appendix B.1. 
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for responses to be dominated by status quo bias. We were interested in how well individuals 
could identify an advantageous tariff when making an active choice. Given this, the proportion 
of participants opting for a ToU tariff will be an overestimate if in reality consumers are able 
to avoid making an active choice of tariff following the instalment of a smart meter. 
This stage judged the quality of choices against consumers’ perception of their own current 
consumption. It is theoretically possible that a participant would choose a tariff not because it 
was cheapest for their current usage pattern, but because it would be cheapest if they made 
certain changes to their electricity usage. However, we designed the options such that where 
the Standard ToU Tariff was cheapest given current usage, the only behaviour change that 
could make an alternative tariff relatively cheaper required an increase in consumption during 
peak times, i.e. the opposite of the intended effect of ToU tariffs. Thus, anticipated behaviour 
change should not explain choices in the Tariff Choice task. 
In addition, this stage manipulated the salience of the Standard ToU tariff relative to other 
options, in a 2 x 2 between-subject design. The two manipulations were: 
Order: For half of participants, the Standard ToU tariff was presented as the top of four tariff 
options. For the other half, the position of this tariff was determined by random selection from 
among the remaining orders. 
Accreditation: For half of participants, the Standard ToU tariff was labelled as a “Standard 
Smart Tariff” via a simple accreditation button placed alongside. The button was plain and was 
simply intended to indicate that it had been accredited as a “standard” tariff option for smart 
meters. The other half of participants saw no indication that this tariff represented a benchmark 
of any kind. 
 
3.3. ToU Tariff MCQ task 
This stage tested whether different presentations of ToU tariffs improve participants’ ability to 
recall and comprehend key information about these tariffs. Two different Standard ToU tariffs 
were presented to participants, who then answered a series of MCQs about them. The questions 
were separated into two types: Memory and Comprehension. Participants viewed information 
about the two tariffs for one minute before it disappeared. They were not explicitly told to 
memorise the information. Six MCQs probed how much information they could recall. The 
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tariffs then reappeared onscreen and participants answered six comprehension questions. The 
full list of questions is provided in Appendix C. 
The main manipulation was how the tariffs were presented. Half the participants saw a 
Standard format shown in Figure 2.a., which simply listed the different rates, times and prices. 
The other half saw an Hourly Breakdown format designed to potentially improve tariff 
understanding, based on existing literature. This was colour-coded in a “traffic light” format 
and presented graphically as a linearized 24-hour clock, as shown in Figure 2.b. For 
consistency, the format that each participant saw in this stage was the same in all other stages 
of the study. We were therefore also able to measure whether tariff format had any effect on 
decision-making in these other tasks. 
Figure 2.a. Example Standard ToU tariff in Standard format (top) 
Figure 2.b. Example Standard ToU tariff in Hourly Breakdown format (bottom) 
 
3.4. ToU Price Comparison Site task 
The final stage generated an objective measure of how well participants could choose between 
different ToU tariffs. Participants were first asked to estimate their own usage throughout a 
seven day week. Responses permitted us to assess consistency with choices made in the earlier 
Tariff Choice task, as well as providing us with a usage pattern against which subsequent 
decisions could be compared. These decisions were made via an online interface that mimicked 
a price comparison site for electricity tariffs. 
For the estimates, participants were asked to provide a percentage breakdown of their 
electricity usage across the Standard ToU tariff time periods. They did this for the 24-hours of 
an average weekday, then for an average weekend day, and finally for an average day across 
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the full seven days of a week (based on their responses for weekday and weekend information). 
They were informed that they would be reminded of this weekly estimate during subsequent 
decisions and that the programme had calculated their exact weekly usage based on their 
weekday and weekend responses7.  
For the decisions, participants were explicitly asked to choose the cheapest ToU tariff for them, 
based on their own perceptions of their current usage. Each one required a choice from among 
three different Standard ToU tariffs. There were six decisions. Relative prices of the three 
tariffs varied over the six decisions. Again, the design of this stage removed future changes to 
electricity usage behaviour as a potential explanation for responses. Although in reality 
consumers may choose a tariff that was not presently the cheapest, but would be if they made 
certain behaviour changes, it was made explicit to participants that the objectively correct 
choice was to minimise cost based on current usage. 
Decisions were incentivised. Each time participants correctly chose the cheapest option based 
on the usage estimates they had supplied, they won an additional ticket for a lottery to win a 
€50 shopping voucher. They understood that one-in-ten participants would win and each 
correct answer increased their chances. This incentive structure was applied for two reasons: 
(1) this stage was the most cognitively demanding and we wanted participants to think carefully 
about decisions; (2) there were objectively correct responses in this stage such that performance 
could be measured. The incentive also ensured that there was equal motivation to answer 
correctly for each of the six decisions, irrespective of previous performance. 
The design of the price comparison interface mimicked current practice. Although ToU tariffs 
in general are not available in Ireland, a few residential consumers are on day/night tariffs. 
Price comparison sites differ in the options available for these customers. Some calculate and 
display potential savings for a consumer who uses an average day/night usage split. Others 
allow the consumer to self-report their own day/night split. In the USA, some providers that 
offer ToU tariffs provide a bill calculator to help participants to compare tariffs (Cappers and 
Sheer, 2016). Consequently, this stage tested whether these different interfaces increase the 
likelihood of selecting the cheapest tariff. Participants were randomly assigned to use one of 
two interfaces: 
                                                          
7 This weekly usage was calculated by the programme by weighting the responses to the weekday usage by 5/7 
and weighting the responses to the weekend usage by 2/7. An example electricity usage calculation can be found 
in Appendix E.1. A comparison of estimated and exact usage patterns can be found in Appendix E.2. 
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Average Usage: Participants were shown costs for each tariff for a consumer with an average 
usage profile. This was calculated using an average annual total usage (4,000 kWh) and average 
profile. Participants were reminded that these costs were a guide and that they were to choose 
the cheapest tariff for their own usage. 
Personal Usage: Participants could input their own usage profile across time periods into a 
personal calculator tool, which then calculated costs across the different Standard ToU tariffs. 
As a default, the usage pattern was set at the average, which participants adjusted.  
 
4. Results 
Participants were 145 Irish consumers aged 18-71 recruited by a market research company. 
The sample was representative of the Dublin population, balanced by gender (48.3% female) 
and age (mean= 39.5, SD= 14.27). The study itself was conducted one participant at a time and 
lasted approximately 40 minutes. Participants were paid €40 for taking part in this study and 
two other unrelated ones, with breaks and refreshments in between. 
 
4.1. Smart Meter task 
Overall, 76.6% of participants responded positively to the letter, stating that they would agree 
to a smart meter installation. More responded positively in the Environment condition (80.6%) 
than the Money condition (72.6%), and in the Roll-Out condition (80.6%) than the No Roll-
Out condition (72.6%). Table 1 reports logistic regression models. A positive response is the 
dependent variable. Experimental manipulations and demographic information are 
independent variables. 
Models 1 and 2 show that the differences between letter types were short of statistical 
significance, with no significant interaction between the manipulations. However, Model 3 
highlights significant differences by individual background characteristics. Participants aged 
18-40 were more likely to respond positively than participants aged over 40 (p= 0.048), while 
females responded positively more than males (p= 0.018). Model 4 finds no significant age-
gender interaction. There was no significant difference by whether participants had a degree, 
nor by response time to the question. 
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Letter Response “Yes” Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 All All All All 
Environment 0.4606 0.3140 0.3413 0.2881 
 (0.399) (0.527) (0.568) (0.568) 
Roll Out 0.4606 0.3140 0.2171 0.2464 
 (0.399) (0.527) (0.558) (0.561) 
Environment * Roll Out ------- 0.3428 0.5653 0.4745 
 ------- (0.811) (0.858) (0.860) 
Age: 18 - 40 ------- ------- 0.9286** 0.4728 
 ------- ------- (0.470) (0.565) 
Female ------- ------- 1.0725** 0.5358 
 ------- ------- (0.454) (0.577) 
18 – 40 * Female ------- ------- ------- 1.3853 
 ------- ------- ------- (1.002) 
Degree ------- ------- -0.1784 -0.1143 
 ------- ------- (0.482) (0.490) 
< Median Response Time ------- ------- 0.3893 0.4006 
 ------- ------- (0.433) (0.436) 
Constant 0.7531** 0.8210** -0.2190 -0.0007 
 (0.320) (0.362) (0.510) (0.533) 
Observations 145 145 143 143 
Standard errors in parentheses, coefficients reported as log odds 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1. Logistic regression models of likelihood to respond positively to smart meter letter 
 
4.2. Tariff Choice task 
The Standard ToU tariff was selected by 37.9% of participants, while 28.3% selected the Flat 
Rate tariff, 25.5% the NS2 ToU tariff and 8.3% the NS3 ToU tariff. Participants who saw the 
Standard ToU tariff at the top (34.2%) in the Order condition were actually on average less 
likely to choose it than those who saw it elsewhere (41.7%), with little difference between those 
who saw the accreditation button (38.4%) than those who did not (37.5%). Table 2 reports 
logistic regression models with Standard ToU tariff choice as the dependent variable. 
Models 1 and 2 finds no significant effect of “Order” and “Accreditation” manipulations, or 
their interaction, on choosing the Standard ToU tariff. Model 3 also reports no significant effect 
of whether a participant responded positively to the smart meter letter in Stage 1. Females were 
significantly more likely to choose the Standard ToU tariff than males (p= 0.033) and 
participants who took longer over the task were marginally more likely to choose it also. 
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Standard ToU Choice Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 All All All 
Order First -0.3152 -0.2076 0.0697 
 (0.344) (0.487) (0.528) 
Accreditation 0.0300 0.1335 0.4484 
 (0.343) (0.479) (0.525) 
Order First * Accreditation ------- -0.2136 -0.7571 
 ------- (0.688) (0.761) 
Standard ToU Cheapest ------- ------- 0.6757 
 ------- ------- (0.481) 
Letter Response “Yes” ------- ------- 0.5355 
 ------- ------- (0.473) 
Hourly Breakdown ------- ------- 0.3498 
 ------- ------- (0.381) 
Age: 18 - 40 ------- ------- -0.6424 
  ------- ------- (0.420) 
Female ------- ------- 0.8593** 
  ------- ------- (0.402) 
Degree ------- ------- 0.5089 
  ------- ------- (0.423) 
< Median Response Time ------- ------- -0.6801* 
 ------- ------- (0.390) 
Constant -0.3519 -0.4055 -1.6598** 
 (0.297) (0.345) (0.759) 
Observations 145 145 143 
Standard errors in parentheses, coefficients reported as log odds 
Table 2. Logistic regression models of likelihood to choose the Standard ToU tariff 
 
As described above, at a later point in the study we asked participants to estimate their usage 
pattern. From these responses we were able to calculate the tariff that would have been cheapest 
given their estimation of their own current usage. Figure 3 compares these optimal (cheapest) 
tariff choices with actual choices. The Standard ToU tariff was estimated to be the cheapest 
tariff for more than three-quarters of participants (78.6%), according to their estimated usage. 
However, fewer than half this number chose it. Indeed, there appears to be an aversion to 
choosing the Standard ToU tariff that is strongly statistically significant (χ2= 142.825, p< 
0.001). Relative to choices that would minimise bills, participants preferred both the NS2 ToU 
tariff (cheapest for 2.1%) (χ2= 393.474, p< 0.001) and the Flat Rate tariff (cheapest for 19.3%) 
(χ2= 7.480, p= 0.006). Based on estimated usage, NS3 ToU tariff was a dominated option, i.e. 
was not cheapest for any participant. Model 3 in Table 2 shows that whether the Standard ToU 
tariff was the cheapest tariff for a participant was not a statistically significant predictor of their 
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choice of this tariff (p= 0.160), although the coefficient was positive. This suggests that other 
preferences (e.g. risk aversion, familiarity, or simplicity) drove decisions. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of actual and expected tariff choice 
 
For an average annual bill, assuming an annual usage of 4,000 kWh, those who did not select 
the cheapest tariff would have paid approximately 11.0% (€74.65) extra per year for their 
electricity, rising to 13.1% (€87.40) for those who specifically failed to select the Standard 
ToU when it was cheapest. Thus, reluctance to select new types of tariff may lead to losses in 
consumer welfare. The simple interventions we tested that aimed to make the Standard ToU 
tariff more salient were insufficient to overcome this. 
 
4.3. ToU Tariff MCQ task 
Overall, participants were correct on an average 7.0/12 (SD= 2.09) MCQ questions. 
Performance was similar across Memory (3.4/6, SD= 1.36) and Comprehension (3.6/6, SD= 
1.31) questions. Contrary to expectations, average performance was better when tariffs were 
presented in the Standard format (7.7/12, SD= 1.84) than the Hourly Breakdown (6.3/12, SD= 
2.11) (t= 4.280, p< 0.001). Participants presented with the Standard format performed better 
on the Memory questions (4.0/6, SD= 1.14) than the Comprehension questions (3.7/6, SD= 
1.27) (t= 1.723, p= 0.089), while the reverse was true for the Hourly Breakdown format, in 
which participants performed significantly worse on the Memory (2.9/6, SD= 1.32) than 
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Comprehension (3.4/6, SD= 1.33) questions (t= -3.060, p= 0.003). Table 3 reports OLS 
regression models with MCQ score as the dependent variable8.  
Model 1 finds that participants in the Hourly Breakdown format answered an average of 1.41 
fewer questions correctly than those in the Standard format (p< 0.001). This effect persists 
when controlling for background characteristics as in Model 2. When separating questions by 
type in Models 3 and 4, participants in the Hourly Breakdown format performed significantly 
worse than those in the Standard format on the Memory questions (p< 0.001), but not the 
Comprehension questions (p= 0.249). The persistent negative coefficient indicates that there 
was not even a hint that the Hourly Breakdown format was of any assistance. 
Educational attainment affected performance. Participants with a degree performed 
significantly better than those without (p= 0.001), increasing the average number of correct 
answers by approximately 1.29 – roughly equivalent to the difference between formats. This 
applied to both Memory (p= 0.029) and Comprehension (p= 0.001) questions. Females 
performed significantly better than males on Memory questions (p= 0.027). There were no 
significant differences based on age or response time. 
MCQ Score Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 All All Memory Comprehension 
Hourly Breakdown -1.4070*** -1.3093*** -1.0561*** -0.2532 
 (0.329) (0.329) (0.203) (0.219) 
Age: 18 - 40 ------- 0.0429 0.3464 -0.3035 
  ------- (0.353) (0.217) (0.234) 
Female ------- 0.4259 0.4580** -0.0321 
  ------- (0.331) (0.204) (0.220) 
Degree ------- 1.2911*** 0.4949** 0.7962*** 
  ------- (0.364) (0.224) (0.242) 
< Median Response Time ------- -0.2292 -0.0718 -0.1574 
 ------- (0.334) (0.206) (0.222) 
Constant 7.7083*** 7.0538*** 3.3914*** 3.6624*** 
 (0.233) (0.372) (0.229) (0.247) 
Observations 145 143 143 143 
R-squared 0.114 0.201 0.271 0.084 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Table 3. OLS regression models of tariff presentation on MCQ score 
                                                          
8 Running OLS regression models assumes normality of residuals in the model. A Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normality in Models 1-4 indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally 
distributed for each (p= 0.102, p= 0.345, p= 0.105, p= 0.341, respectively), and so we judge OLS regression 
models to be appropriate. An alternative model would be an ordered logistic model, and the results are 
unchanged when an ordered logistic model was used. 
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Appendix D reports performance by question type. Performance was significantly worse in 
Hourly Breakdown for questions relating to the specific timings of rates (t= 7.277, p< 0.001; 
t= 2.171, p= 0.032), but did not differ for questions about rate costs (t= 1.080, p= 0.282). It is 
possible that the time-line rather than colour coding reduced retention of information. The only 
advantage of the Hourly Breakdown format was the speed with which participants were able 
to respond to questions about durations of rates, which was faster than for the Standard format 
(p= 0.005), presumably because they could simply count hours on the line rather than perform 
the elementary arithmetic.  
Overall, we found no evidence that the Hourly Breakdown format systematically improves 
tariff understanding. Indeed, we found strong evidence that it negatively affects retention of 
key tariff attributes of the tariffs. In addition, as shown in analyses for other stages (Tables 2, 
4 and 5), the format did not affect responses in other stages of the study. 
 
4.4. ToU Price Comparison Site task 
In the ToU Price Comparison Site task, those who only saw average tariff costs in the Average 
Usage condition correctly chose 4.3/6 (SD= 1.39) tariffs. Those who were able to personalise 
tariff costs in the Personal Usage condition correctly chose 5.1/6 (SD= 1.21), a statistically 
significant difference (t= 3.718, p< 0.001). Table 4 presents ordered logistic regression models. 
The number of correct decisions is the dependent variable with scores of 0, 1, and 2 (i.e. those 
performing at or below chance) pooled to satisfy the proportional odds assumption9. 
Model 1 shows that participants in the Personal Usage condition had significantly higher total 
correct scores than those in the Average Usage condition (p< 0.001). Model 2 finds a 
marginally significant effect of educational attainment; participants with a degree had higher 
total correct scores than those without (p= 0.075). There were no significant differences by age 
or gender. Model 3 incorporates participants’ accuracy at estimating their exact weekly usages. 
Participants whose estimates deviated no more that 20%-points for all combined time periods 
from the calculated usage had significantly higher total correct scores than those with greater 
                                                          
9 Here we determined that an OLS regression model would be inappropriate. The distribution of correct 
responses was heavily left-skewed and non-normal (Shapiro-Wilk, p< 0.001). The appropriateness of an ordered 
logistic regression is predicated on it passing the proportional odds assumption. Due to very low incidence of 
0/6 and 1/6 scores it was not possible to compute the Brant test required to test the proportional odds 
assumption. Pooling scores of 0/6, 1/6 and 2/6 (i.e. those performing at or below chance) overcame this issue, 
and a Brant test indicates Models 1, 2 and 3 passed the proportional odds assumption (p= 0.423, p= 0.733, p= 
0.745 respectively). The results of the models do not substantively not differ when these scores are not pooled. 
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than 20%-points (p< 0.001). Once estimate accuracy is specified, in Model 3, the effect of 
having a degree is reduced and no longer statistically significant. The main effect of the 
Personal Usage tool is unchanged. 
Total Correct Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 All All All 
Personal Usage 1.2550*** 1.1056*** 1.1367*** 
 (0.316) (0.343) (0.351) 
Hourly Breakdown ------- -0.2495 -0.0820 
 ------- (0.313) (0.320) 
Age: 18 – 40 ------- -0.1091 -0.1406 
  ------- (0.347) (0.359) 
Female ------- -0.3277 -0.2228 
  ------- (0.317) (0.322) 
Degree ------- 0.6195* 0.3201 
  ------- (0.348) (0.363) 
< Median Response Time ------- 0.3233 0.5141 
 ------- (0.332) (0.347) 
Estimate Inaccuracy (21% +) ------- ------- -1.3660*** 
 ------- ------- (0.351) 
Observations 145 143 143 
Standard errors in parentheses, coefficients reported as log odds 
Table 4. Ordered logistic regression models of likelihood to choose the Standard ToU tariff 
 
In the Personal Usage condition it was necessarily true that the Personal Usage tool was of use 
only if it was engaged with, otherwise the interface was just as in the Average Usage condition. 
Participants in Personal Usage condition set the tool to match their estimated usage 67.8% of 
the time and to something other than their estimated usage 21.0% of the time. It remained 
unused 11.2% of the time. When the tool was set equal to estimated usage participants chose 
the cheapest tariff 91.9% of the time, falling to 73.9% when set to something other than the 
estimated usage and 65.3% when the calculator was not used. Table 5 reports logistic 
regression models with whether a cheapest tariff was chosen as the dependent variable for 
participants in the Personal Usage condition only. To account for the non-independence of 
decisions at the participant level, we specified a random-effect that assumed normal variation 
in the likelihood of a correct response. The reference category is “Used – Not Estimate”, which 
corresponds to using the tool but setting the values to something other than the usage estimate.  
Model 1 shows that when participants used the tool and set it equal to the value of their 
estimated usage, they were significantly more likely to choose the cheapest tariff for their own 
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usage than when it was used but set to something else (p< 0.001). There was no statistically 
significant difference between using the tool but setting it to something other than estimated 
usage and not engaging with the tool at all, although the incidence rate of not engaging with 
the tool was low (11.2%). Model 2 finds no significant differences in the likelihood of choosing 
the cheapest tariff based on tariff presentation, age, gender, educational attainment or response 
time, while the effects of personal usage tool engagement remain largely unchanged. Evidently, 
the personal usage tool helped consumers to choose the cheapest tariff for their usage, but only 
if used, and used correctly. 
Cheapest Tariff Choice Model 1 Model 2 
 All  All 
Used - Estimate 1.7902*** 1.5823*** 
 (0.451) (0.488) 
Not Used -0.1507 -0.2994 
 (0.545) (0.562) 
Hourly Breakdown ------- -0.2421 
 ------- (0.428) 
Age: 18 - 40 ------- 0.2486 
  ------- (0.480) 
Female ------- -0.1993 
  ------- (0.454) 
Degree ------- 0.2759 
  ------- (0.525) 
< Median Response Time ------- 0.2611 
 ------- (0.382) 
Constant 1.1428*** 1.1680** 
 (0.348) (0.547) 
Observations 438 426 
Participants 73 71 
Standard errors in parentheses, coefficients reported as log odds 
Table 5. Logistic regression models of likelihood to choose the cheapest tariff among those in 
the Personal Usage condition 
 
5. Discussion 
This exploratory study obtained responses from a representative sample of consumers to a 
series of questions, decisions and judgements related to smart meter installation and ToU tariff 
choice. It assessed attitudes to the installation of smart meters, initial choice of tariff and the 
ability to match an estimated pattern of personal usage to a ToU tariff. At each stage, 
21 
 
experimental manipulations were used to test whether consumer choices were affected by how 
information was presented.  
The positive attitude to smart meter installation recorded in this study was greater than in other 
recent findings in Ireland (Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 2018b). These previous 
findings were responses to single survey questions asked without any communication 
regarding the potential benefits of smart meters. It is therefore possible that providing citizens 
with information about benefits increases acceptance, although there are clearly other 
differences between the studies. The positive response rate we observed is, naturally, likely to 
be an overestimate of response rates if letters were to be sent to homes. In addition to the 
possibility of exaggerated responses due to hypothetical bias within the study, in real contexts 
some letters may never be opened or read. In this study, letters were placed in front of 
participants who dedicated time solely to reading the letter. Moreover, this study asked only 
about intentions to act. Intentions may not lead to action. Nevertheless, the findings indicate a 
high degree of acceptability of smart meters.  
The study recorded a significant aversion to more complex ToU tariffs, relative to more 
conventional tariff options. For most consumers in this experiment, based on the estimated 
usage they supplied, the Standard ToU tariff would have been cheaper than conventional 
alternatives based on their own estimates of their current usage, yet many did not choose it. 
This aversion might lead to consumer detriment. Participants who did not select the Standard 
ToU tariff when it was cheapest would have added an average of 13.1% to their electricity bill. 
Simple interventions involving accreditation and ordering of tariff choice were insufficient to 
mitigate this aversion. Relative to the Standard ToU tariff, the more popular Flat Rate and NS2 
ToU were simpler (comprised fewer changing time periods) and hence required less cognitive 
effort for comparisons of cost calculations. Furthermore, for individuals who were unsure of 
their usage, the simpler tariffs entailed less uncertainty, as there were fewer changes in rates 
throughout the day. The simpler tariffs also contained less costly penalties for using electricity 
at more expensive times. Arguably, therefore, despite making an apparently disadvantageous 
decision by avoiding the smart tariff, a rational consumer might be understandably wary of a 
more complex offering with uncertain benefits, offered by a provider who has presumably 
designed it on the basis of data and analysis. In addition, the simpler tariffs were probably more 
familiar to consumers (as they are already present in current domestic markets) and evidence 
from behavioural science suggests that individuals respond more positively to familiar 
alternatives – a mere-exposure effect (e.g. Bornstein, 1989). 
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The comparability of the four choice options relative to one another may also have been a 
factor. Behavioural evidence surrounding the attraction, compromise and similarity effects 
shows that relative differences between options can alter choices in systematic and predictable 
ways (Huber et al., 1982, Simonson, 1989). The availability of multiple ToU tariffs may have 
induced participants to select some form of dynamic pricing tariff, such that the NS2 ToU tariff 
became attractive as a compromise option – dynamic but the least dynamic ToU tariff. Future 
research could isolate and test these hypotheses by independently manipulating the range and 
types of tariff choice options presented.  
This study intentionally removed the potential for anticipated energy behaviour change to 
influence responses throughout the experimental stages. However, this is undeniably an 
important consideration for consumers choosing between different ToU tariffs. This issue is 
particularly pertinent given the existence of an intention-behaviour gap (e.g. Sheeran and 
Webb, 2016), where anticipated actions do not necessarily result in behaviour change. Future 
research could incorporate the role of anticipated behaviour change into the tariff choice 
decisions of consumers, and in electricity markets where these are real choice decisions, the 
accuracy of consumer’s predictions of their own future behaviour change could be measured. 
A propensity for consumers to incorrectly predict future behaviour change could also lead to 
reduced quality of tariff choices. 
Allowing consumers to make use of a personalised calculation tool when choosing between 
different ToU tariffs had a substantial positive effect on the quality of decision-making, 
compared to showing costs only for an average consumer. This is potentially important for the 
introduction of ToU tariffs. Smart meters generate exact readings of time-specific usage, 
allowing consumers to compare tariffs based on their specific usage patterns, provided they 
have a means for doing so. Presently, price comparison sites often default to comparisons based 
on average annual usage. Our findings show that this has a negative impact on choices. 
Finally, the finding that the way ToU tariffs are presented can influence consumers’ ability to 
retain key information is also important. The linearization of time in the Hourly Breakdown 
condition hindered recall, perhaps because the colour coding and depiction of an individual 
block for each hour of the day meant that the exact timing of transitions from one period to the 
next became less salient. The ease with which a consumer can recall tariff information may be 
indicative of the immediacy of understanding and is likely to be important, for instance, when 
comparing tariffs across providers. Nevertheless, participants could answer questions about 
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tariff rate duration more quickly when presented with this Hourly Breakdown format. The 
appropriateness of tariff presentation may therefore depend on which aspects of ToU tariffs are 
judged to be most important. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The main aim of this study was to provide insight into decisions faced by electricity consumers 
in anticipation of the roll-out of smart meters and ToU tariffs. In particular, we identified a gap 
in the literature regarding how effectively individuals could decide between ToU tariffs, given 
that the benefits are dependent on usage patterns. There is some positive support for the 
introduction of smart meters, but an aversion to ToU tariffs relative to less complex ones 
(including existing flat rate tariffs). This aversion may lead to consumer detriment and is 
impervious to relatively simple interventions designed to improve take-up. Allowing 
consumers to use tools that facilitate personalised price comparison can improve decisions and 
may encourage successful ToU tariff adoption among electricity consumers. However, an 
important overall message from the present study is that consumers’ ability to match usage to 
appropriate ToU tariffs cannot be taken for granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
References 
Asensio, O. I., and Delmas, M. A. (2015), Nonprice incentives and energy 
conservation, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112, 510-515 
Bager, S., and Mundaca, L. (2017), Making ‘Smart Meters’ smarter? Insights from a 
behavioural economics pilot field experiment in Copenhagen, Denmark, Energy Research & 
Social Science, 28, 68-76 
BE Works (2014), Behavioural economics review: Analysing and nudging energy 
conservation and demand shifting through time of use compliance, BE Works, 1-125 
Belton, C. and Sugden, R. (2018), Attention and novelty: An experimental investigation of 
order effects in multiple valuation tasks, Journal of Economic Psychology, 67, 103-115 
Beshears, J., Choi, J.J., Laibson, D., and Madrian, B.C. (2008), How are preferences 
revealed, Journal of Pubic Economics, 92, 1787-1794. 
Bornstein, R. F. (1989), Exposure and affect: overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968–
1987, Psychological Bulletin, 106, 265 
Bruce, D., and Papay, J.P. (1970), Primacy effects in single-trial free recall, Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 9, 473-486 
Buryk, S., Mead, D., Mourato, S., and Torriti, J. (2015), Investigating preferences for 
dynamic electricity tariffs: The effect of environmental and system benefit disclosure, Energy 
Policy, 80, 190-195 
Cappers, P. and Sheer, R. (2016), Final report on customer acceptance, retention, and 
response to time-based rates from consumer behavior studies, Smart Grid Investment Grant 
Consumer Behavior Study Analysis, 1-73 
Commission for Energy Regulation (2011), Electricity smart metering customer behaviour 
trials findings report, Commission for Energy Regulation Information Papers, 11080a, 1-146 
Commission for Regulation of Utilities (2018a), Smart meter upgrade: Standard smart tariff 
proposed guideline, Commission for Regulation of Utilities Consultation Paper, CRU/18/084, 
1-17 
Commission for Regulation of Utilities (2018b), 2017 electricity and gas retail markets 
annual report, Commission for Regulation of Utilities Publications, 18126, 1-158 
25 
 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2014), Quantitative research into public 
awareness, attitudes, and experience of smart meters: Wave 4, available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/277045/key_findings_summary_quantitative_sm_public_attitudes_research_wave_4.pdf 
Dowding, K. and John, P. (2009), The value of choice in public policy, Public Administration, 
87, 219-233 
Dütschke, E., and Paetz, A-G. (2013), Dynamic electricity pricing - Which programs do 
consumers prefer?, Energy Policy, 59, 226-234 
European Parliament (2009), Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
council of 13  July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 16-62 
Falk, A., and Heckman, J. J. (2009), Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the 
social sciences, Science, 326, 535-538 
Faruqui, A., Harris, D., and Hledik, R. (2010a), Unlocking the €53 billion savings from 
smart meters in the EU: How increasing the adoption of dynamic tariffs could make or break 
the EU’s smart grid investment, Energy Policy, 38, 6222-6231 
Faruqui, A., Sergici, S., and Sharif, A. (2010b), The impact of informational feedback on 
energy consumption—A survey of the experimental evidence, Energy, 35, 1598-1608 
Faruqui, A., and Palmer, J. (2012), The discovery of price responsiveness – a survey of 
experiments involving dynamic pricing of electricity, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2020587 
Fell, M. J., Shipworth, D., Huebner, G. M., and Elwell, C. A. (2015), Public acceptability 
of domestic demand-side response in Great Britain: The role of automation and direct load 
control, Energy Research & Social Science, 9, 72-84 
Fischer, C. (2008), Feedback on household electricity consumption: A tool for saving energy?, 
Energy Efficiency, 1, 79–104 
Harrison, G. W., and Rutström, E. E. (2008), Experimental evidence on the existence of 
hypothetical bias in value elicitation methods, Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 
1, 752-767 
26 
 
Hledik, R., Gorman, W., Irwin, N., Fell, M., Nicolson, M., and Huebner, G. (2017), The 
value of ToU tariffs in Great Britain: Insights for decision-makers, prepared for Citizens 
Advice, available at: 
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/Energy/The%20Value%20of%20T
oU%20Tariffs%20in%20GB%20-%20Volume%20I.pdf 
Hobman, E. V., Frederiks, E. R., Stenner, K., and Meikle, S. (2016), Uptake and usage of 
cost-reflective electricity pricing: Insights from psychology and behavioural 
economics, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 57, 455-467 
Huber, J., Payne, J.W., and Puto, C. (1982), Adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives: 
Violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis, Journal of Consumer Research, 9, 90-
98 
Littlewood, J. A., Lourenço, S., Iversen, C. L., and Hansen, G. L. (2016), menu labelling is 
effective in reducing energy ordered and consumed: A systematic review and meta-analysis of 
recent studies, Public Health Nutrition, 19, 2106-2121 
Lunn, P. D., and Choisdealbha, Á. N. (2018), The case for laboratory experiments in 
behavioural public policy, Behavioural Public Policy, 2, 22-40 
Mogilner, C., Rudnick, T., and Iyengar, S. (2008), The mere categorization effect: How the 
presence of categories increases choosers' perceptions of assortment variety and outcome 
satisfaction, Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 202-215 
McElvaney, T. J., Lunn, P. D., and McGowan, F. P. (2018), Do consumers understand PCP 
car finance? An experimental investigation, Journal of Consumer Policy, 41(3), 229-255 
Nicolson, M., Huebner, G., and Shipworth, D. (2017), Are consumers willing to switch to 
time of use electricity tariffs? The importance of loss-aversion and electric vehicle ownership, 
Energy Research and Social Science, 23, 82–96 
Nicolson, M. L., Fell, M. J., and Huebner, G. M. (2018), Consumer demand for time of use 
electricity tariffs: A systematized review of the empirical evidence, Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 97, 276-289 
Qiu, Y., Colson, G., and Wetzstein, M. E. (2017), Risk preference and adverse selection for 
participation in ToU electricity pricing programs, Resource and Energy Economics, 47, 126-
142 
27 
 
Samuelson, W., and Zeckhauser, R. (1988), Status quo bias in decision making, Journal of 
risk and uncertainty, 1, 7-59 
Schwartz, D., Bruine de Bruin, W., Fischhoff, B., and Lave, L. (2015), Advertising energy 
saving programs: The potential environmental cost of emphasizing monetary savings. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 21, 158-166 
Sheeran, P. and Webb, T. (2016), The intention–behavior gap, Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 10, 503-518 
Simonson, I. (1989), Choice based on reasons: The case of attraction and compromise effects, 
Journal of Consumer Research, 16, 158-174 
Sintov, N. D. and Schultz, P. (2015), Unlocking the potential of smart grid technologies with 
behavioral science, Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 410-417 
Stenner, K., Frederiks, E., Hobman, E.V., and Meikle, S. (2015), Australian consumers' 
likely response to cost- reflective electricity pricing, available at: 
http://globalize.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CSIRO-Understanding-Customer-
Response-to-New-Tariffs-Final.pdf 
Steinhorst, J., Klöckner, C. A., and Matthies, E. (2015), Saving electricity–For the money 
or the environment? Risks of limiting pro-environmental spillover when using monetary 
framing, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 43, 125-135 
Sunstein, C. R. (2011), Empirically informed regulation, University of Chicago Law Review 
78, 1349-1429 
Wilson, C. M. and Waddams Price, C. (2010), Do consumers switch to the best 
supplier?, Oxford Economic Papers, 62, 647-668 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Appendix A. Templates of smart meter letters in Smart Meter Letter task 
 
Appendix A.1. Smart Meter Letter - Environment Benefits 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam,  
 
We are offering to replace your current electricity meter with a new -X- Electric smart meter. Smart 
meters offer real time feedback of electricity usage, by reporting current electricity usage every 30 
minutes. 
 
Smart meters can help each of us to do our bit for the environment by providing real time usage 
information and showing you how much electricity you are using at any given time. This can help you 
to cut out wasteful electricity use. 
 
We will come and install a new smart meter for free. It will take approximately 2 hours for an engineer 
to fit the meter and your electricity supply will not be interrupted during the installation. 
 
Your current contract will not change, but if you install a smart meter, you will have the option to 
consider future time-of-use tariffs, as well as the flat rate tariffs currently available to you. If you keep 
your current meter type, you will not be able to consider time-of-use tariffs in the future. 
 
While current flat rate tariffs only charge one price for electricity for the whole day, time-of-use tariffs 
charge different prices for electricity at different times of the day. They help address the issues of 
demand on electricity supply, by charging more when demand is higher and less when demand is lower. 
This helps to make electricity supply more reliable and can reduce the risk of power outages. 
 
[The government is committed to rolling out smart meters in every household by 2024. This means that 
if you do not arrange a smart meter installation now, we will get in touch to try and arrange installation 
at another time.]10 
 
Why not start taking advantage of a smart meter today? 
 
Yours Sincerely,  
Smart Metering Team, -X- Electric 
                                                          
10 This paragraph was only included in the Roll-Out condition 
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Appendix A.2. Smart Meter Letter - Money Benefits 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
We are offering to replace your current electricity meter with a new -X- Electric smart meter. Smart 
meters offer real time feedback of electricity usage, by reporting current electricity usage every 30 
minutes. 
 
Smart meters can help to make electricity billing simpler by providing real time electricity usage. This 
removes the need for estimated bills and so means you only ever pay for the electricity you use. 
 
We will come and install a new smart meter for free. It will take approximately 2 hours for an engineer 
to fit the meter and your electricity supply will not be interrupted during the installation. 
 
Your current contract will not change, but if you install a smart meter, you will have the option to 
consider future time-of-use tariffs, as well as the flat rate tariffs currently available to you. If you keep 
your current meter type, you will not be able to consider time-of-use tariffs in the future. 
 
While current flat rate tariffs only charge one price for electricity for the whole day, time-of-use tariffs 
charge different prices for electricity at different times of the day. This may allow some customers to 
save money on their electricity bills by shifting their electricity usage to times of the day when electricity 
is cheaper. This can give customers more control over their electricity costs. 
 
[The government is committed to rolling out smart meters in every household by 2024. This means that 
if you do not arrange a smart meter installation now, we will get in touch to try and arrange installation 
at another time.]11 
 
Why not start taking advantage of a smart meter today? 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
Smart Metering Team, -X- Electric 
 
 
                                                          
11 This paragraph was only included in the Roll-Out condition 
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Appendix B. Additional information about tariff usage patterns 
 
Appendix B.1. Time periods for rates for different tariffs in Tariff Choice task with example 
rates 
Standard ToU: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 17:00 13.8 c/kWh 
Peak Rate 17:00 – 21:00 29.1 c/kWh 
Normal Rate 21:00 – 23:00 13.8 c/kWh 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 9.7 c/kWh 
 
NS3 ToU: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 17:00 16.3 c/kWh 
Peak Rate 17:00 – 23:00 27.2 c/kWh 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 12.2 c/kWh 
 
NS2 ToU: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 23:00 21.4 c/kWh 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 12.2 c/kWh 
 
Flat Rate: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 08:00 19.6 c/kWh 
 
 
Appendix B.2. Average usage profile for Standard ToU tariffs 
 
For the proposed Standard ToU tariff, the average usage profile assumed in this study was as 
follows: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 17:00 40% 
Peak Rate 17:00 – 21:00 25% 
Normal Rate 21:00 – 23:00 10% 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 25% 
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Appendix C. Multiple choice questions in ToU Tariff MCQ task by question type 
 
Memory Questions 
Cost Memory 
What was the Peak rate in Tariff [A]12? 
What was the Normal rate in Tariff [B]? 
Rate Memory 
For how many hours did the Peak rate in Tariff [B] last? 
At what time did the Off-Peak rate start in Tariff [A]? 
Time Specific Memory 
What rate would be used at 09:30 in Tariff [A]? 
What rate would be used at 20:00 in Tariff [B]? 
 
Comprehension Questions 
Tariff Calculation 
For how many hours in total does the Normal rate in Tariff [A] last? 
In Tariff [B], which rate lasts for a longer time, the first Normal rate, or the Off-Peak rate? 
Cost Calculation 
What is the difference in cost between the Peak rates of the two tariffs? 
Which tariff has the greatest difference in cost between Peak and Off-Peak rates? 
Usage Calculation 
If a customer used 50% of all electricity at Peak rate and 50% at Normal rate, which of the two 
tariffs would be cheaper? 
If a customer used 25% of all electricity in each of the four time rates, which of the two tariffs 
would be cheaper? 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 To attempt to control for possible order effects in understanding of these questions, the tariff order and 
specific tariff used in each question was randomised. 
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Appendix D. Question type in ToU Tariff MCQ task 
 
Appendix D.1. Performance by question type in ToU Tariff MCQ task 
As can be seen from Figure D.1 below, performance within the subsets of Memory questions 
was consistently worse on average in Hourly Breakdown than in Standard. However, 
performance in the Cost Memory questions was not significantly worse in Hourly Breakdown 
(p= 0.282). Performance in both Rate Memory (p< 0.001) and Time Specific Memory (p= 
0.032) were significantly worse and especially so in Rate Memory. This suggests that the 
difficulty that participants in Hourly Breakdown faced was related to the specific times of the 
rates, as opposed to the actual rate costs themselves. Tentatively, this suggests performance 
was hindered more by the linearization of time as opposed to the ‘traffic-light’ colour coding, 
however, as we have not explicitly tested for this, this is conjecture. 
As can be seen in Figure D.2 below, performance within each of the subsets of Comprehension 
questions was consistently worse on average for Hourly Breakdown than Standard. However, 
these differences in all three, Tariff Calculation (p= 0.890), Cost Calculation (p= 0.226) and 
Usage Calculation (p= 0.418) were not statistically significant. 
 
Figure D.1. Tariff Memory question performance by presentation type (left) 
Figure D.2. Tariff Comprehension question performance by presentation type (right) 
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Appendix D.2. Response time by question type in ToU Tariff MCQ task 
Separating question types and measuring response times may give some indication as to the 
ease with which participants responded to different questions. Figure D.3 below reports that 
there were no significant differences in average response times within the Memory questions, 
neither for the questions that performance differed by format:  Rate Memory (p= 0.930) or 
Time Specific Memory (p= 0.658), nor for the questions that performance did not significantly 
differ by format: Cost Memory (p= 0.937). 
Figure D.4 below reports that, on average, response times for Comprehension questions were 
significantly longer than those for Memory questions. Across question types there was 
evidence of substantial difference in response times for Tariff Calculation questions, with 
participants who saw the Hourly Breakdown format responding significantly quicker than those 
who saw the Standard format (p= 0.005). This was in spite of there being no significant 
differences in the likelihood to answer these questions correctly. There were no significant 
differences in the response times of Cost Calculation (p= 0.156) or Usage Calculation (p= 
0.491) questions. 
Figure D.3. Tariff Memory question response times by presentation type (left) 
Figure D.4. Tariff Comprehension question response times by presentation type (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Standard Hourly Standard Hourly Standard Hourly
Tariff Calculation Cost Calculation Usage Calculation
M
C
Q
 C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
o
n
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 
T
im
e 
(s
ec
s)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Standard Hourly Standard Hourly Standard Hourly
Cost Memory Rate Memory TS Memory
M
C
Q
 M
em
o
ry
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 T
im
e 
(s
ec
s)
34 
 
Appendix E. Usage information in ToU Price Comparison Site task 
 
Appendix E.1. Calculation of weekly usage in ToU Price Comparison Site task 
Below is an example of weekly usage calculation in the ToU Price Comparison Site task. 
Suppose a participant estimated the following weekday usage: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 17:00 45% 
Peak Rate 17:00 – 21:00 20% 
Normal Rate 21:00 – 23:00 10% 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 25% 
 
Suppose this participant estimated the following weekend usage: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 17:00 55% 
Peak Rate 17:00 – 21:00 20% 
Normal Rate 21:00 – 23:00 15% 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 10% 
 
The weekly usage was calculated in the following way: 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 17:00 (45% * (5/7)) + (55% * (2/7)) = 47.9% 
Peak Rate 17:00 – 21:00 (20% * (5/7)) + (20% * (2/7)) = 20.0% 
Normal Rate 21:00 – 23:00 (10% * (5/7)) + (15% * (2/7)) = 11.4% 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 (25% * (5/7)) + (10% * (2/7)) = 20.7% 
 
This calculation assumes that actual usage is identical across the seven days of a week; 
weekday usage accounts for 5 days a week, and weekend usage accounts for 2 days a week. To 
help participants understand this, it was stressed in the instructions for this task, as seen below: 
“Calculating your weekly electricity usage assumes you use the same amount of electricity 
every day, but remember that there are more weekdays than weekend days.” 
 
Appendix E.2. Comparison of estimated vs. exact usage calculations in ToU Price Comparison 
Site task 
Rate Time Period Average Estimated Exact 
Normal Rate 08:00 – 17:00 40.0% 32.2% 30.5% 
Peak Rate 17:00 – 21:00 25.0% 32.1% 33.2% 
Normal Rate 21:00 – 23:00 10.0% 19.3% 20.5% 
Off-Peak Rate 23:00 – 08:00 25.0% 16.4% 15.8% 
 
